Vidar

Overview

Trojan:Win32/Vidar (commercially marketed as Vidar Stealer) is a prolific, commercially available information-stealing trojan first observed on underground Russian cybercrime forums in late 2018. Architecturally forked from the Arkei stealer source code, Vidar operates under an accessible Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) rental model costing between $250 and $500 per month. Vidar specializes in the rapid, comprehensive harvesting of sensitive user data from infected Windows hosts, including cryptocurrency wallets (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Monero, Electrum, MetaMask), stored web browser credentials and autocomplete history (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Brave), active session cookies, FTP client credentials (FileZilla), VPN profiles, and desktop two-factor authentication tokens (Authy). Vidar pioneered novel C2 rendezvous techniques, utilizing public social media profiles (Telegram channels, Steam community bios, Twitter accounts, and Mastodon bio descriptions) as unblockable dead-drop resolvers that dynamically point worker bots to active C2 IP addresses. Once credential collection is completed and exfiltrated over HTTP POST, Vidar executes automated self-deletion commands to eliminate forensic traces.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Vidar
• Vidar Stealer
• Trojan.Vidar
• Spyware.VidarStealer
• PWS.Win32.Vidar

Threat Actor Attribution

Attribution is probabilistic, not a science. Each link below states its confidence level and the evidence behind it.

• Russian Cybercrime Underground High confidence
  Basis:
• Vidar MaaS Operators High confidence
  Basis:

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Arkei

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Vidar V1.0 · Vidar Telegram Dead-Drop Edition · Vidar Modular Stealer (2022-2024)

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
• T1566.001: Scan email attachments for malicious macros, scripts, or suspicious archive files.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2017-11882 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2022-30190 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Command & Control (C2) and Network Profile

How this family talks to its operators. C2 traffic can often identify a family even when its code and configuration are hard to analyse. Ports and patterns are historical and change between campaigns, so use them as hunting leads rather than block-only rules.

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 4b6c33fef79ebbcce763ffca07fa81215b493c4e3658ebc76b9ee2f8719cb49d
• 89a27eb2762eb295fe3509bc9f636257a3e7ef7b1bcfd1a7b489d81d6f228b7e

Delivery vectors

• cracked_software_torrents
• malvertising
• phishing_attachments

Persistence mechanisms

• None (Self-Deleting Execution)

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_VIDAR_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Vidar"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "vidar" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "vidar" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "vidar stealer" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan.vidar" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "spyware.vidarstealer" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "pws.win32.vidar" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Vidar (Infostealer) Execution & Triage
id: 8e0fcc68-515b-5054-a97c-47c2fa0d2ee7
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Vidar malware family. Detects browser credential database harvesting, master
  key queries, and DPAPI extraction routines typical of modern infostealers.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/vidar
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/infostealer-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.infostealer
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1555_003
- attack.t1114_001
- attack.t1102_001
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1070_004
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
    - \AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles
    - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data
    - vaultcmd.exe /list
    - dpapi
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_VIDAR_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Vidar tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "vidar" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Force immediate global password and session token revocation for all accounts accessed on affected hosts.
2. Transfer cryptocurrency funds to newly generated hardware-backed offline wallets immediately.
3. Block outbound HTTP communication to identified Vidar dead-drop endpoints and C2 servers.
4. Apply security patches for Microsoft Office vulnerabilities CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2022-30190.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Never store master passwords, seeds, or unencrypted private keys in plaintext desktop files or browser autofill.
2. Avoid downloading cracked software, keygens, or games from untrusted file repositories.
3. Do not allow unmanaged employee workstations to access corporate email without hardware MFA.

References & External Analysis

• Recorded Future Insikt Group: Technical Analysis of Vidar Stealer
• Mandiant Threat Research: Infostealer Ecosystem Overview
• NIST National Vulnerability Database CVE-2022-30190
• Search "vidar" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "vidar" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "vidar" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Infostealer)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Socelars
• Eyestye
• Qqpass
• Redline
• Ribaj
• Ponystealer
• Advpassman
• Azorult

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/vidar.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.